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Abstract
This paper analyses the harmful interference of uncertainty on the effectiveness
of fiscal policy. We investigate this issue through the lens of a Structural Vector Auto
Regressive (SVAR) model for the United States and Brazil.
Imposing government spending shocks, we find a positive effect on economic
activity. The results suggest Keynesian effects on consumption and GDP. To assess
the effects of uncertainty, we used the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU)
and the World Uncertainty Index (WUI). Our findings indicate that the fiscal effects
are considerably less intense when uncertainty reaches high levels, consistently with
the Real Options approach. The results suggest that agents are more cautious when
the high uncertainty overshadows the outline of the economic scenario. In this sense,
uncertainty disturbs agents’ decisions and decreases consumption, investment and
economic activity.
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1 Introduction
Throughout economic history, we have observed, with a greater or lesser degree of conta-
gion and persistence, that economies have been affected by shocks of uncertainty, panic
and resulting economic slowdown. According to Baum and Koester (2011) monetary
policy alone cannot foster economic activity, particularly because many countries have
reached the zero lower bound.
The United States and European countries have reacted with new actions to overcome
or at least mitigate the effects of the international crisis and recession. Stimulus pack-
ages were developed, with emphasis on fiscal policy, such as the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (2009)2. Among other objectives, the Act purposes to preserve and
create jobs, promote economic recovery and invest in transportation and infrastructure to
provide long-term benefits.
In this sense, governments and researchers were encouraged to redefine the role of fiscal
policy and the number of publications on fiscal multipliers increased considerably after
the global financial crisis (2007).
Figure 1: Fiscal Multipliers (Total Publications by Year). Source: Web of Science (All Data Base).
Despite the crises observed over the years (financial instability, trade disputes or viral
pandemics) have different roots, we see similarities in negative effects on agents’ confi-
dence and how uncertainty overshadows consumption and investment decisions in differ-
ent countries.
2“Making supplemental appropriations for job preservation and creation, infrastructure investment, en-
ergy efficiency and science, assistance to the unemployed, and State and local fiscal stabilization. Source:
https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/1/text
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Considering this, experts have debated the best strategy for fiscal policy and whether tra-
ditional instruments to stimulate the economy should be used. Therefore, some questions
come to the centre of the debates. How does uncertainty affect the effectiveness of fiscal
policy? Are these effects different in emerging economies? How does the transmission
of fiscal policy occur in times of high and low uncertainty? What are the real effects of a
fiscal policy?
These questions are central to economic theory. However, the responses are not conver-
gent, especially when the uncertainty arising from international crises or political insta-
bility has the potential to significantly slow the global economy.
Despite the renewed interest in the role of fiscal instruments, the size and persistence
of multipliers varies considerably. This stems from the nature of the fiscal variables,
conjunctural factors (recessions or expansion), structural characteristics (trade openness,
labour market rigidity, exchange rate regime and debt level) and data frequency and reli-
ability.
Reichling and Whalen (2012) find multipliers for US data between 0.75 to 2.25 for
macroeconomic forecasting models and between 0.3 and 3.5 for time series models. In
addition to the conjunctural and structural factors, the type of fiscal instrument (tax, con-
sumption and investments) affect the intensity of the multiplier. In this sense, fiscal mul-
tipliers for infrastructure spending and different types of public investment are larger than
those for government consumption (Whalen and Reichling, 2015).
Ramey (2019) analysed the state of knowledge about fiscal policy ten years after the
global financial crisis. The author indicates that multipliers on general government pur-
chases (developed countries) are positive and less than or equal to one. Thus, the estimates
across the leading approaches suggest a range of 0.6 to 1. However, the range could be
larger for countries with different structure, such as the exchange rate regime.
For Brazil, the academic debate returned only a few years later and one of the most de-
bated issues is fiscal balance. One of the challenges of the Brazilian economy is to pro-
mote reforms, including that of social security. For Auerbach (1996), one of the goals of
tax reform should be to generate the right environment to stimulate investment and pro-
mote the positive effects of well-being. The Brazilian government has signalled3 (official
news agency) that, with the reforms approved, confidence will be restored and, conse-
quently, there will be conditions for the expansion of investments and consumption in a
sustained manner.4
3 https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/noticia/2019-09/com-reformas-crescimento-economico-
sera-sustentavel-diz-campos-neto.
4https://www.em.com.br/app/noticia/economia/2019/07/14/internaseconomia,1069532/adol f o −
sachsida−acredita−que− economia− pode− voltar−a− crescer−de−3−a−4.shtml.
3
In other words, the expansion would be possible due to the reduction of public expendi-
ture and the deficit/GDP. With the improvement of insolvency conditions, the government
would create a shock of confidence in the agents that would invest and consume more,
boosting the economy5. Unfortunately, the economic team bet (at the time of the imple-
mentation of the public spending ceiling) that private investment would offset the cut in
public spending, but this was not confirmed, even before the COVID-19 pandemic.
This bet may be closely linked to the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, and for some au-
thors (Vieira, 2006; Candelária, 2012) the Brazilian economy does not have agents with a
Ricardian profile. Even if Brazilians had a Ricardian profile, some economists do not be-
lieve it would be enough to solve the problem of insufficient demand, due to conjectural
factors (high unemployment and indebtedness of the population) and structural factors
(the composition of the tax burden and the lower participation in GDP of dynamic sectors
such as transformation and communication) that would prevent this resumption. There-
fore, economic reforms and fiscal adjustments are necessary conditions, but they are not
enough for stable and sustainable growth.
Rezende and Cunha (2013) argue that although there is an understanding of the need
for reforms, there is considerable divergence in scope and especially in the way it is
conducted. For the authors, the need to contain the growth of the State is discussed
through the imposition of legal limits, without observing the role that the public budget
plays in modern democracies.
In the same vein, Pires (2016) argues that long-term structural reforms are important to
maintain fiscal sustainability, but it is difficult to maintain harmony between short-term
recovery and a public debt stabilization agenda that is too rigid and too little feasible to
be fulfilled.
Just as the role of fiscal policy, uncertainty shocks (international crises, political instability
and corruption) have aroused the interest of researchers. Even with the growing empirical
and theoretical interest there are few studies about uncertainty shocks on fiscal policy and
their implications for economy and welfare. There is an even greater shortage of research
for emerging countries, especially Brazil (Gechert and Rannenberg, 2018; Barboza and
Zilberman, 2018). Bloom (2014) suggests that high levels of uncertainty make consumers
and investors more cautious and disrupts the effectiveness of public policies, especially in
developing economies.
Decision-making by economic agents involves the formation of expectations, supported
by the quality and quantity of information available. In this sense, the construction of
5The constitutional amendment (2016) - ”ceiling on public spending”, has controlled the growth of
public spending, repressed public investment and fiscal policy but did not stimulate the economy. In this
sense, different experts have questioned the theories of the neoclassical school.
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expectations is influenced by uncertainty, given that many events do not have very clear
information, while others are unpublished, so they do not have a defined probability. Un-
certainty appears in the literature as a key variable to understand the dynamics of eco-
nomic agents’ decisions. However, the definition, the scope of the effects and ways of
measuring it may vary.
Knight (1921) draws a distinction between risk and uncertainty, where uncertainty is a
random variable associated with a state with an uncertain future in a probabilistic space
that is not perfectly established, whereas the risk would have the space clearly determined.
Keynes (1936) also highlighted the importance of uncertainty in economic dynamics,
where individuals in uncertainty are not guided or decide through probabilistic models,
but are influenced by what they determined to be ”animal spirits”.
The concept of uncertainty was expanded with the work of Savage (1954), where he in-
stituted a more practical perspective when establishing subjective probabilities. However,
the behaviour in the face of uncertainty was the target of several criticisms. Ellsberg
(1961) in addition to demonstrating that some of Savage’s assumptions were not stable
also criticized the theory of utility and argued that individuals react differently when faced
with situations involving ignorance of the future.
Therefore, economic uncertainty concerns a situation where the consumer or investor
needs to decide without having the perfect information about the future in question. In
light of this, studies use different measures to examine the effects of uncertainty on the
consumer or financial market. Bloom et al. (2016) developed an indicator (Economic Pol-
icy Uncertainty - EPU) that offers a proxy for movements in economic policy uncertainty
over time. This index accounts for the number of times words associated with economic
uncertainty or political uncertainty appear in widely circulated newspapers. As Barbosa
(2018) points out, the hypothesis is that economic agents are attentive to the media to
calculate the degree of uncertainty in the economy.
Ahir et al. (2018) developed a new index, the World Uncertanty Index (WUI). Unlike
the EPU, two factors facilitate comparability between countries. The index is based on a
single source (economic and political developments) and the reports follow a standardised
process.
Antonakakis et al. (2013) examined the volatility of the stock market return as a way
of measuring uncertainty and analysed the correlation with the indicator and economic
policy uncertainty of Baker et al. (2012). They use the S&P500 returns, the VIX6 and
Economic Policy Uncertainty Index.
6VIX calculates market expectation of volatility by stock index option prices. It represents the expecta-
tion of 30-day forward-looking volatility.
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Figures 2 and 3 provide an overview of an uncertainty indicator for the United States
(1985 - 2019) and Brazil (1996 - 2018). The graphs present the different moments with
high and low uncertainty7. In this case, uncertainty is measured by the Economic Policy
Uncertainty Index (EPU)8. We also added the growth of the real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP).
Figure 2: Uncertainty and GDP Growth - USA: 1985-2019. (right axis, % GDP). Source: FRED and
Economic Policy Uncertainty.
We investigate the effects of uncertainty shocks on effectiveness of fiscal policy for the
United States and Brazil. The aim is not to compare the two economies, but to analyse, in
the light of the same methodological approach, whether uncertainty disturbs agents’ de-
cisions and affects the effectiveness of public spending. Inspired by the works of Aastveit
et al. (2013) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we investigate these issues through the
lens of an SVAR model.
In this sense, our main contribution is to investigate how private agents react under con-
ditions of uncertainty and how the different levels of uncertainty affect fiscal multipliers.
As far as we know, this work is the first to quantify the extent to which the effectiveness
of fiscal policy changes with the level of uncertainty and influences fiscal multipliers for
Brazil.
7Low ≤ 2nd quartile and High ≥ 3rd quartile.
8”To measure policy-related economic uncertainty, we construct an index from three types of underly-
ing components. One component quantifies newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty.
A second component reflects the number of federal tax code provisions set to expire in future years.
The third component uses disagreement among economic forecasters as a proxy for uncertainty.” Source:
https://www.policyuncertainty.com/methodology.html.
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Figure 3: Uncertainty and GDP Growth - Brazil: 1996-2018. (right axis, % GDP). Source: IBGE and
Economic Policy Uncertainty.
To achieve these objectives, two models are examined for each country. First, we cal-
culate standard fiscal multipliers and examine the effects of fiscal policy on economic
performance. In the second model, we investigate how the intensity of the multipliers
is affected when we control the effects of the interaction of uncertainty with fiscal policy
shocks. In this sense, we use two uncertainty indices: Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
(EPU) and World Uncertainty Index (WUI).
Our models indicated the presence of Keynesian effects. For both countries, increases in
public spending have a positive effect on household consumption and the level of eco-
nomic activity. We also find indications of the crowding-out effect of public spending on
private investment in the United States.
Another important finding is that the assumption of low effectiveness of fiscal policy was
verified when the projection of economic scenarios is uncertain. The impact and persis-
tence of fiscal policy are considerably less intense when uncertainty reaches high levels.
Observing the causal chain of events, an increase in uncertainty makes agents more cau-
tious postponing consumption and investment decisions. This behaviour spreads through-
out the economy and, even with fiscal stimulus, the effects on GDP are less intense.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is the literature review. Section 3 presents
the data. Section 4 depicts the methodology and model specification, Section 5 describes
the empirical models and results, and Section 6 concludes.
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2 Literature
Fiscal policy can be described as a set of rules associated with government instruments
such as investments, spending, taxes and resource allocation. From the theoretical per-
spective, Gali et al. (2007) argue that there are basically two central versions of the effects
of fiscal stimulus. In the first version, if the households behave in a Ricardian fashion
(infinitely-lived) and consumption decisions are based on an intertemporal budget con-
straint, a fiscal stimulus decreases the present value of income and reduces consumption
due to a negative wealth effect (Gali et al., 2007). On the other hand, if households are
not Ricardian (Keynesian framework) a fiscal expansion may lead to an increase in con-
sumption, because in this case consumption depends on current disposable income.
According to Keynesian approach, changes in fiscal instruments initially affect the con-
sumption of specific groups. This change in consumption, in turn, will affect demand
from other groups and ultimately aggregate demand. However, the degree of change in
aggregate demand depends on the fiscal multipliers and the conditions under which the
economy operates.
Burda and Wyplosz (1997), examine different studies and point out that the Ricardian
approach has many controversial consequences and there is contrary and in favour of
this hypothesis. They highlight studies for Germany, United States, and Belgium (1974-
1994) that do not support the Ricardian hypothesis. Evans and Hasan (1994) investigated
whether Canadian consumers behave like Ricardian agents, and the tests indicated that
the hypothesis that consumers act in Ricardian fashion cannot be rejected.
Studies for emerging countries are scarce, but it is possible to observe a pattern in the
results. Khalid (1996) studied Ricardian equivalence and empirical evidence for develop-
ing economies. The results suggest that temporary increases in public spending may have
some expansionary effect on aggregate demand.
Céspedes et al. (2012) studied the effects of government spending in the Chilean econ-
omy. The article provides evidence that consumption and GDP increase when government
raises spending and reveals large and robust fiscal multipliers. The evidence can be ex-
plained by the presence of non-Ricardian households. Such existence has been cited as a
crucial factor to understand the channel of government spending.
Some researches (Reis et al., 1998; Issler and Lima, 2000; Vieira, 2006) do not accept the
hypothesis of Ricardian equivalence for the Brazilian economy. Candelaria (2012) used
data from 1997 to 2009 and rejected the Ricardian profile hypothesis for agents in Brazil.
The study confirms that a fiscal stimulus increases consumption and generates benefits for
the population.
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As argued by Kilponen et al. (2015), fiscal multipliers can be obtained through different
approaches, and a crucial point is how the multiplier is measured. The Vector Auto Re-
gression (VAR) model is a prominent approach to fiscal studies, and multiplier values are
extracted from standardised fiscal impulses (Gechert and Rannenberg, 2018). This per-
spective is referenced by the seminal article by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for the US
economy. After this paper the SVAR approach was highlighted in the literature on fiscal
multipliers and different authors added new variables to the system (Baum et al.,2012;
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Huidrom et al.,2019).
The effects of fiscal policy can be calculated using different multipliers.
M Impact =
∆Y (t)
∆G(t)
(1)
M Fixed horizon =
∆Y (t +N)
∆G(t)
(2)
M Peak =MaxN
∆Y (t +N)
∆G(t)
(3)
M Cumulative =
∑
N
i=0 ∆Y (t + i)
∑
N
i=0 ∆G(t +1)
(4)
Despite extensive research (theoretical and empirical) there is still considerable disagree-
ment about the size of fiscal multipliers. Batini et al. (2014) argue that simulations for
advanced economies suggest that first-year multipliers range from 0 to 1 (under normal
conditions). In the same line, Mineshima et al. (2014) report that first year multipliers
have an average of 0.75 for public spending and 0.25 for public revenue. However, there
is divergence and several studies have shown that multipliers may exceed 1 under strong
deceleration.
Kilponen et al. (2019) estimate of the magnitude and sign of fiscal multipliers (short
and the long run) for European countries. A key result is that under standard monetary
policy the short-run multipliers presents values smaller than one in the majority of simula-
tion. Transitory decreases in government consumption are associated with larger short-run
GDP effects than transitory increases in the tax rate on capital income, households’ labour
income, and consumption. In addition, two-year-long zero lower bound (ZLB) describes
small impacts on the multipliers in the case of a transient measure adopted by a single
country of European Area (EA) and cross-country reverberations are less intense. On the
other hand, when the same fiscal effect is concomitantly introduced by members of EA,
the ZLB has an intense response on short-run government consumption multipliers (larger
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than one).
Gechert and Rannenberg (2018) highlight that structural factors such as high uncertainty,
more flexible labour market, high trade openness, flexible exchange rate regime and high
debt reduce the fiscal multipliers. In addition, temporary factors can affect the multipliers
such as the business cycle and degree of monetary accommodation to fiscal shocks.
As stressed by Batini et al. (2014) little is known about the size of fiscal multipliers for
emerging economies. Dechert and Rannenberg (2018), point out that there are few studies
for developing countries, especially for Brazil and the results are divergent. According to
Ilzetzki et al. (2013), emerging countries with high levels of debt (above 50% of GDP)
have a negative fiscal multiplier on impact and can be very negative in the long run.
Corroborating those perspectives, studies from the IMF (2008) conclude that such mul-
tipliers are negative, especially in the long run. For some authors (Ilzetzki et al., 2013;
Ilzetzki, 2011) the response of output to increases in government consumption is negative
on impact and the multipliers of emerging and low-income economies are smaller than
in advanced economies. They also conclude that the response is also considerably less
persistent than in advanced countries.
However, Carrière-Swallow et al. (2018) analysed the effects of fiscal consolidation on
economic activity for 14 economies in Latin America and the Caribbean (1989-2016)
and concluded that the fiscal multipliers are very similar to those found for developed
countries.
For Brazil, Peres (2006) found small but significant positive fiscal multipliers. On the
other hand, Mendonça et al. (2009) find evidence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy
(1995-2008). Mathenson and Pereira (2016) estimated the multipliers for the Brazilian
economy, and they found that government spending has not a persistent and significant
effect on output since 2009.
In opposite direction, Sanches and Carvalho (2019) developed a Structural VAR based on
Blanchard and Perotti (2002)’s approach. They analyse the multipliers in two different
samples, pre-crisis (1997 - 2014) and full sample (1997 - 2017). The results point to
a larger and more persistent multiplier of primary federal spending on GDP for the full
sample compared to the pre-crisis sample.
The following is a summary table of other contributions to the value of fiscal multipliers,
and we highlight the papers on government spending. In the Brazilian case, we selected
an article with public investment due to the relevance of the study and the magnitude of
the results.
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Table 1: Examples of Fiscal Multiplier Analyses
As mentioned above, multipliers may vary significantly due to factors such as monetary
policy response, openness level, labour market flexibility and exchange rate regime. Thus,
they play a crucial role in determining the result of the multiplier. Regarding economic
uncertainty and the effects on multipliers, the impact of multipliers in times of uncertainty
is difficult to predict.
Since seminal works by Knight (1921) and Keynes (1936), several empirical and theoreti-
cal researches have been conducted to strengthen our understanding of uncertainty and the
effects on investment, consumption, asset prices and output growth. Many authors, with
different approaches, have studied how the uncertain events discourage the investments
and GDP. In this sense, Bernanke (1993) emphasises that uncertainty creates an incentive
to delay investment and hiring new employees.
Manteu and Serra (2017) evaluate three possible transmission channels of uncertainty.
The first is associated with the real options approach, where agents can postpone decisions
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to avoid the costs associated with errors. The second channel refers to precautionary
savings. In this case, the greater the uncertainty regarding income in the future can induce
households to reduce current consumption in order to increase reserves for the future. This
behaviour decreases the marginal propensity to consume and the size of fiscal multipliers.
In the last channel, economic agents may demand higher risk premiums. In this scenario,
asset prices decrease and financing costs increase.
The literature provides different approaches for measuring uncertainty and examining the
effects on GDP, well-being and agents’ decisions. One of the challenges of assessing the
effects of uncertainty on agents’ decisions and economic performance is the definition
of what we qualify as uncertainty, since it cannot be observed directly. However, it can
be represented by different proxies, which highlight different dimensions of uncertainty,
each with advantages and limitations.
These indicators can be represented by the expectations of participants in the financial
markets and the volatility of indices in those markets. One of the criticisms is that its cov-
erage may be restricted to the financial environment, not capturing more general impacts
on the economy. In this group of indicators, we highlight volatility of the stock market
return and the market expectation of volatility by stock index option prices (VIX).
Another possibility is to capture the effects of uncertainty by terms contained in the news
media or newspapers. A possible imperfection of the index is the bias and imprecision of
the analysis of the facts. The Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) and World Uncertainty
Index (WUI) are prominent representatives.
A third way of understanding the behaviour of uncertainty is associated with the discrep-
ancy of the analyses and projections developed by specialists. A possible deficiency is
contained in the limitations of applied questionnaires and not only observing the effects
of uncertainty, but other aspects that obscure the conclusions.
These measures could help to understand how countries recover from crisis periods. Baker
et al. (2012) point out that uncertainty explains the slow recovery in the USA. They
describe many potential factors behind the slow recovery since 2009. One of them is the
increase in uncertainty. It can hamper investment, the entrepreneurs become reluctant
to make decisions. In addition, households adopt a more cautious attitude and carefully
evaluate their consumption and savings decisions.
Besides that, Baker et al. (2016) found evidence (Unites States) that uncertainty shocks
can be correlated to recessionary periods and reduce the incentive for investment and
consumption. They suggest that high political uncertainty in the United States and Europe
in recent years may have hampered macroeconomic performance.
Meinen and Röhe (2017) examine the influence and adverse effects of uncertainty on in-
vestment and output in the euro area, with emphasis on Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
They study the effects of five uncertainty proxies: the stock market volatility, a survey
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derived measure of expectations dispersion, a newspaper indicator based on Economic
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) and two indicators following the concept of unpredictability.
The analysis of the different uncertainty proxies is conducted based on descriptive evi-
dence and a VAR model. The findings indicate that all the uncertainty measures analysed
described countercyclical behaviour.
For some authors (Bloom et al., 2012) uncertainty is classified as a potential element that
defines the intensity and duration of a recessive period. They examined how time-varying
uncertainty affects the policy ineffectiveness and how the expansive policy depends on
uncertainty. The authors developed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
non-convex adjustment costs and advocate that uncertainty shocks are potential factors
shaping business cycles. The findings suggest that uncertainty makes firms cautious and
substantially changes the response of the economy to the stimulus.
Aastveit et al. (2013) investigated the transmission channels of uncertainty in the United
States and studied whether uncertainty affects the effectiveness of monetary policy. The
findings show that monetary policy influence on economic activity is faint when uncer-
tainty is high. The authors use as main measure of uncertainty the volatility of stock
market (United States), VXO index of implied volatility (Chicago Board Options Ex-
change).
For the Brazilian economy, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment pointed out that a potential increase in political instability (political uncertainty)
could jeopardize a scenario of confidence recovery in the coming years (OECD, 2017).
As noted, there are a considerable number of studies that assess the effects of different un-
certainty proxies on economic performance. However, there are few studies for emerging
countries. For Brazil, we highlight the work of Barbosa (2018). This paper investigates
the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty shocks on the main fiscal components of the
Brazilian federal government. Uncertainty is measured using the economic Policy Uncer-
tainty Index (EPU). Despite the different contributions, the author does not analyse the
impacts of a fiscal multiplier under conditions of uncertainty.
2.1 Investment Strategies under Uncertainty: Real Options Approach
Regarding the effects of uncertainty, the theoretical literature indicates that uncertainty
has a negative effect on output. Different reasons as precaution (Keynes, 1936), incentive
to postpone investments and consumption would reduce the fiscal effects on economic
activity.
In this section, we use a simple model to highlight how uncertainty affects a decision that
can be postponed. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) argue that investors consider two impor-
tant factors in investment decisions: irreversibility and the possibility of postponing the
decision to invest.
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In this sense, when a firm invests (irreversible investment), it ”kills” the option to invest.
Thus, it gives up the possibility of waiting for new information. This lost option value is
an opportunity cost that must be included as a cost of the investment. Therefore, the Net
Present Value (NPV) rule must be adjusted. (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
The presence of irreversibility (partial or total) of investments and the possibility of delay
are very important characteristics of most investments. Associated with a scenario of
uncertainty about the future, the opportunity to postpone investment is like a financial call
option.
The following explanation is inspired by the classic book by Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
Consider a firm that is deciding today (t=0) invest and that will produce for a long period
(perpetuity) and the investment (φ ) is irreversible. Installation and operation start today.
The initial net benefit is equal to y0 but could change next year: it will increase to yH1
with probability p, or will decrease to yL1 , with probability (1-p). Then, the net benefit will
remain in the new level forever. σ denotes the degree of volatility or uncertainty in the
next period. The expected net benefit, E(y), will be equal to p . yH1 +(1− p).yL1 = y0.
Figure 4: Uncertainty and Future Net Benefit
Therefore, the entrepreneur needs to decide whether to invest and the best time. The
traditional perspective of the firm’s decision is described as:
E(π0) =−φ +
∞
∑
t=0
p · [(1+σ) ·y0]+ (1−p) · [(1−σ) ·y0]
(1+ r)t
(5)
When NPV is greater than zero, the firm must invest. However, the expected NPV (E (π0))
rule ignores the option that the firm can wait until next year, observe economic conditions
and only then decides whether to invest or not. Investing now means exercising the option
and pay an opportunity cost equal to the option value. The value of the option to invest
today is defined as OpO :
Op0 = p ·
[(
−φ
1+ r
)
+
∞
∑
t=1
(1+σ) ·y0
(1+ r)t
]
(6)
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After including the opportunity cost (Option), we have the following expression.
VRO0 =−φ +
∞
∑
t=0
p · [(1+σ) ·y0]+ (1−p) · [(1−σ) ·y0]
(1+ r)t
−p ·
[(
−φ
1+ r
)
+
∞
∑
t=1
(1+σ) ·y0
(1+ r)t
]
(7)
If OpO is greater than NPV or V R.O0 less than zero, the firm must postpone the investment.
Otherwise, the firm must invest. Next, we analyse how uncertainty affects the firms’
decision making.
∂V R.O0
∂σ
=
y0 · (p−1)
r
≤ 0 (8)
As we can see, an increase in uncertainty (stable average) discourages investment and
generates delay or postponement effect.
An initial question is how the firm reacts to an increase in net benefit. Higher benefit re-
sults from several possibilities, for instance, productivity or increased sales due to higher
consumer income, stimulated by fiscal policy. Another relevant question is how the firm
reacts to an increase in net benefit, when there is increasing uncertainty. The following
expression indicates that, in these circumstances, the effect of an increase in net benefit
from a fiscal stimulus is negative ( p < 1).
∂ 2V R,00
∂σ ·∂y0
=
p−1
r
≤ 0 (9)
When entrepreneurs are faced with a scenario of high uncertainty, they evaluate more
than the stimulus on their sector. They examine the options available, such as the option
to postpone the investment. Thus, the marginal incentive for investment can have a small
impact. This result reflects the ”caution effect” described by Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
and highlighted by Aastveit et al. (2013) when analysing the effectiveness of monetary
policy in the United States.
Alloza (2017), estimates the impact of government spending shocks on economic activity
during periods of high and low uncertainty and during periods of boom/recession. The
author highlights similar effects on household consumption. In an environment of high
uncertainty, private agents are concerned with the economic slowdown and reduction of
income levels in the future, in turn producing a decline in consumption and economic
activity.
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3 Data
The United States national accounts series are in billions of Chained 2012 Dollars (sea-
sonally adjusted). The series are based on the natural log of government spending (con-
sumption and investment), gross government investment, household consumption, private
investment and output (GDP). They are available on Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
FRED database.9 The sample covers the period from 1985Q1 to 2019Q4, for a total of
140 observations.
The Brazilian series are in billions of national currency units and seasonally adjusted
(chained 1995). The series are: the natural log of government spending (consumption),
household consumption and GDP. The sample is smaller than the US series and covers the
period from 1996Q1 to 2018Q4 (92 observations). The database is made available by the
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), Brazilian Institute of Economics
(IBRE) and Institute of Applied Economic Research (Ipea).
Initially, we investigated the effects of public spending (consumption and investment) on
private agents and GDP. Then, we examined the effects of uncertainty on the effectiveness
of fiscal instruments on economic activity. This paper analyses the effect of two uncer-
tainty indicators, Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU)10 and World Uncertainty
Index (WUI)11
The following table summarises the main results of the statistical description and results
of the unit root test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test).
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Tests (Brazil).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
9https://fred.stlouisfed.org/tags/series/.
10http://www.policyuncertainty.com/methodology.html.
11https://www.policyuncertainty.com/wuiquarterly.htmlandwww.policyuncertainty.com/media/WUImimeo1029.pd f
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Tests (United States).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 5: Brazil - Series. Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 6: United States - Series. Source: Authors’ calculations.
The series are non-stationary (level), except for the EPU (constant) and WUI. From the
results obtained (Appendix), we can consider that the other series are stationary for the
first differences of the original variables.
4 Model Specification
In this article, we study, based on the SVAR approach, the effects of fiscal stimulus and
uncertainty shocks on macroeconomic variables such as GDP, private consumption and
investment. The VAR and SVAR methods are justified by the choice of variables for the
orthogonalization of impulses, necessary for the estimation of impulse response functions
(IRFs). The following is a concise review of the methodology used.
The VAR model can be described as a system in which each variable is regressed on itself
and other model variables lags.
Yt =W +B1yt−1 + . . .+Bpyt−p +ut (10)
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Where :
Yt =
(
y1t . . . yKt
)′
is the vector of endogenous variables;
Bi = K×Kcoefficient matrices;
W =
(
v1 . . . vK
)′
denotes the vector of constants;
ut =
(
u1t . . . uKt
)′
represents the error vector;
p is the number of lags of endogenous variables.
We can estimate the model described (reduced-form) using ordinary least squares (OLS).
Besides that, we can observe that the correlation of the residuals represents the contem-
porary relationship between the variables of our model.
The reduced-form system does not allow us to infer the structure and dynamics of eco-
nomic variables. In addition, we cannot interpret ut as structural shocks, because they are
contemporaneously correlated. In this case, it is not possible to identify the exogenous
shock of each endogenous variable of the model.
Since we are interested in fiscal shocks, we need a model that isolates the exogenous
effect of each variable, which is possible with structural VAR (SVAR) models. Therefore,
to investigate the effects of fiscal shocks and the behaviour of other variables, we need
to establish orthogonal shocks and ascertain the economic significance of innovations. In
other words, we are interested in a model with the following form:
AYt = BYt−1 + et , et ∼ N(0, I) (11)
In this model, the elements of et are serially uncorrelated and independent of each other.
However, we cannot use OLS to estimate SVAR models, because regressors are correlated
with the error term, and we would violate one of the hypotheses of the method. One of
the problems is that matrix A presents the contemporary relationships of endogenous
variables. The solution is to multiply SVAR by A-1.
A−1AYt = A−1BYt−1 +A−1et
et ∼ N(0, I)
Yt =VYt−1 +ut
ut ∼ N (0,Σu)
(12)
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From the last expression we can deduce that:
V = A−1B
ut = A−1et
Σu = A−1IA−1′ = A−1A−1′
The question is how to identify A-1. For a model with three variables and one lag, we
have 9 unknowns and 6 values (the system is over-parameterized), and it is not defined.
Therefore, it requires coefficient restrictions, which results in the identification of a struc-
tural system. To this specific example, we need to impose three restrictions. For a more
general case the identification of the structural VAR requires that (n2-n)/2 restrictions be
imposed.
Enders (2008) and Lütkepohl (2005) have shown that the constraints on the coefficients
described in Cholesky decomposition make A-1 triangular12.
They argue that in addition to being sufficient, Cholesky decomposition shows that the
ordering of variables in the structural model must be done so that the first variable affects
all others contemporaneously. The second variable does not affect the first but influences
all the others and so forth.
In general, choosing a different ordering of the variables generates distinct shocks and
thus the impacts on the system depend on the way the variables are arranged in the vector.
Martin et al. (2013) argue that the recursive approach described above has essentially
statistical foundations and imposes a rigid and strict structure. In this sense, the dynamics
of the model may not be consistent with the structure of the process that we intend to
investigate. On the other hand, an SVAR model can mitigate this problem by imposing
restrictions motivated by economic theory.
In this paper, the SVAR approach is the crucial tool for estimating the dynamic relation-
ships between economic variables. However, the focus is not on the estimated parameters,
but the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) arising from them. Therefore, the purpose of
our structural model lies in the analysis and evaluation of the effects of uncertainty and
fiscal policy instruments on other variables over time. To study the impacts of fiscal policy
and uncertainty shocks on the level of economic activity, we adjusted the models accord-
ing to the methodology proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The following is a
simplified example to illustrate Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) approach.
12The proposed method (Cholesky factors) describes that an invertible matrix can be divided into two
lower triangular factors. Furthermore, we can verify that the decomposition results in exactly (n2-n)/2 A
values equal to zero, which makes it a sufficient method to constrain the structural model.
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The equation describes a basic model.
Zt = A(L, p)Zti +U (13)
Zt =[GC, HC, GDP]’ is a three-dimensional vector in the natural log of quarterly real
government consumption (gc), real household consumption (hc) and real GDP (y). The
term A(L, p) is a four-quarter distributed lag polynomial.
ugct = αgcyu
y
t +βgchce
hc
t + e
gc
t
uhct = αhcyu
y
t +βhcgce
gc
t + e
hc
t
uyt = γyhcu
hc
t + γygcu
gc
t + e
y
t
(14)
Where, ugct ,uhct and u
y
t are the unexpected movements in government consumption, pri-
vate consumption and GDP, respectively. However, egct ,ehct and e
y
t are structural shocks
that are not correlated with each other and do not depend on the dynamics of economic
activity. As we can note, the reduced form residuals (gc, hc and gdp) have little economic
relevance, because they are linear combinations of the underlying structural government
consumption, private consumption, and GDP shocks.
The first equation highlights the unexpected movements in government spending can be
due to the response to unexpected movements in GDP (αgcy), the response to structural
shocks to private consumption (βgchc) and to structural shocks to government consump-
tion, egct . The second equation has a similar interpretation with respect to unexpected
fluctuations in household consumption. Finally, the last equation states that unexpected
movements in GDP can be due to unexpected changes in government spending, household
consumption and unexpected shocks (eyt ).
The coefficients (αgcy,αhcy,γyhc and γygc) cannot be estimated without bias, since the
residuals of the reduced form are correlated with the structural shocks in the above equa-
tions, so that the coefficients obtained by OLS are biased and inconsistent.
To recover the parameters, the hypothesis of identification for high frequency data is based
on Blanchard and Perotti (2002). They argue that identification is obtained due to the
time-lapse between the identification of the event, institutional relations and the effective
action of fiscal policy. Thus, we emphasise that policymakers take more than a quarter to
react in response to GDP shocks. After the shock, it is necessary to approve fiscal policy
in other institutions and only after to implement the policy.
As our research data are quarterly, the argument and the hypothesis of identification are
justified. Thus, there is no response from fiscal variables to output or private consumption
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(αgcy = 0 and βgchc = 0). In addition, private decisions are contemporaneously affected
by fiscal policy. It is justifiable for consumers and entrepreneurs to make their decisions
after the announcement of government spending (Brinca, 2006).
However, private agents do not react instantly to output, either due to the presence of
habits or the need for time to perceive the change (αhcy=0). On the other hand, GDP
is the result of these elements, and it is reasonable to assume that it is affected by them
contemporaneously, but that it does not affect any variable.
5 Empirical Models and Results
5.1 Model 1: United States (1985Q1 – 2019Q4)
In our first model, the economic variables are the growth rates of general government
spending (GG), private investment (PI) and output (GDP). In order to investigate other
fiscal policy effects, we replace private investment with household consumption.
Yt =C+
p
∑
i=1
AiYt−i + εt (15)
Where: C is a (3x1) vector of intercept terms;
Yt represents the Yt = [∆ lnGGt ,∆ lnPIt ,∆ lnGDPt ] ;
A is the matrix of autoregressive coefficients of order (3x3) and the vector of disturbances
is εt =
[
εGGt ,ε
lP
t ,ε
GDP
t
]
.
Table 4: Lag Order Selection Criteria (model 1 Gov Spending USA and Priv Invest).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The model is stable, since all inverse roots of the characteristic polynomial lie within the
unit circle. The assumptions associated with the residuals were verified (Appendix).
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To understand the effects of each variable on the others, we simulated the Impulse Re-
sponse Functions (IRF). An inspection of the IRFs indicates that public spending has a
positive effect on GDP (impact) and private consumption (until the first quarter). The
observed effects are statistically different from zero (95% confidence interval). They al-
low an assessment of fiscal policy in terms of immediate output response to a shock in
the fiscal instrument to mitigate the effects of a political crisis or adverse shock. On the
other hand, an analysis suggests that government spending does not encourage private
investment.
The variance decomposition can be interpreted as the proportion of those movements due
to shocks to itself and shocks to other variables. Thus, we can observe the percentage of
the Mean Square Error of the prediction of one variable attributed to shocks on another
variable.
In this case, the variance decomposition allows us to highlight the relevance of public
spending on GDP and private investments. The contributions of 10% (GDP) are still
substantial after 10 periods.
Our findings are in line with different studies for the United States. Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) studied the effects of fiscal policy (1947Q1 to 1997Q4) using an SVAR model.
They find that government spending shocks have a positive effect on GDP. In addition,
increases in government spending have a strong negative (significant) effect on invest-
ment spending. Ramey (2008) and Fatás and Mihov (2001) found similar effects for the
output, however the response of private investment to the government spending shock is
insignificant in Fatás and Minhov.
Other papers based on SVAR models, such as Galı́, López-Salido and Vallés, J. (2007),
highlight multipliers greater than one. They also find positive effect on private consump-
tion.
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Function (model 1 Gov Spending USA - Consumption and Investment).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 8: Impulse Response Function (model 1 Gov Spending USA - Consumption and Investment).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 9: Variance Decomposition (model 1 Gov Spending USA). Source: Authors’ calculations.
5.2 Model 2: United States (1985Q1 – 2019Q4)
To analyse the effects of uncertainty and effectiveness of fiscal policy, we adapted the
model in line with Aastveit et al. (2013). They investigated the effectiveness of monetary
policy for Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway. They found that
monetary policy shocks have a lower effect when uncertainty is high. These findings are
consistent with the real options approach.
The authors estimated how uncertainty acts together on endogenous variables in an SVAR
model, and they used the same methodological approach as Towbin and Weber (2013),
where uncertainty is an exogenous interaction variable. In our model we are interested
in the interaction between uncertainty and other variables, especially the effects of fiscal
policy on output.
The economic variables are the growth rates of general government spending (GG), pri-
vate investment (PI) and output (GDP). As in the previous model, we evaluated the fiscal
effects on household consumption (HC).
Therefore, in this basic model our specification is:
Yt = A+BXt +
p
∑
i=1
(CYt−1 +DYt−1Xt−1)+ εt (16)
Where:
A is a (3x1) vector of intercept terms; The vector of disturbances is εt =
[
εGGt ,ε
PI
t ε
GDP
t
]
.
Yt represents the vector of endogenous variables and Xt is the measure of uncertainty,
Economic Political Uncertainty (level). Furthermore, the model allows the variable GGt
to interact with Xt . In this case, uncertainty is assumed to be exogenous.
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To assess the interaction effects, we calculate the estimated IRF of fiscal policy shocks for
a high level of uncertainty (above the 3rd quartile) and a low level of uncertainty (below
the 2nd quartile). The standard reduced form VAR models (above) are used to identify a
fiscal policy shock and investigate its effects at times of high and low uncertainty.
Y Hight = Â0 + B̂0
High
.X̂0 +
p
∑
i=1
(
B̂i
High
.Yt−i
)
+ Êt (17)
Y Lowt = Â0 + B̂0
Low
.X̂0 +
p
∑
i=1
(
B̂i
Low
.Yt−i
)
+ Êt (18)
We intend with this model to verify that the results are in line with the Real Options ap-
proach. In other words, in the presence of high uncertainty private agents would be more
cautious, postponing their consumption and investment decisions. As a consequence, the
effects of government spending are expected to be less, in an environment of high uncer-
tainty.
The impulse response functions point to a rather curious effect when we divide the sample
into high uncertainty (high EPU) and low uncertainty (low EPU). First, we observe that
public spending, under high uncertainty, has a negative influence on private investment
and maintain their negative cumulative effect for seven quarters. Thus, the IRF suggest
that high uncertainty discourages firms. Finally, public expenditures seem to have a neg-
ative (insignificant) effect on GDP when the level of uncertainty is low13.
13 The model (high EPU) has two lags and the model for low EPU one lag.
26
Figure 10: Impulse Response Function – High EPU (model 2 Gov Spending USA). Source: Authors’
calculations.
Figure 11: Impulse Response Function – Low EPU (model 2 Gov Spending USA). Source: Authors’
calculations.
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To assess confidence in the results, we changed the model14 and replaced private invest-
ment with household consumption. Although the results on GDP are negative after the
shock of government spending associated with EPU (High and Low), they are not statis-
tically significant.
Figure 12: Impulse Response Function – GDP and Private Cons - High EPU (model 2 Gov Spending USA).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 13: Impulse Response Function – GDP and Private Cons - Low EPU (model 2 Gov Spending USA).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
To deepen the analysis, we used the World Uncertainty Index (WUI) instead of the EPU
and found that GDP responses to shocks of fiscal variables are in line with the literature15.
As in the previous model, GDP and private investment show a negative effect after the fis-
cal shock associated with WUI (High). However, the responses are statistically significant
in the impact on output and persist for another quarter for private investment. When we
analyse the effects on household consumption, the results are more inaccurate and similar
to the model with EPU.
14The number of lags is equal to two.
15The models that assess the effect of public spending on private investment have 3 lags (high WUI) and
one lag (low WUI). The models that analyse the effects on private consumption have one lag .
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Figure 14: Impulse Response Function – GDP, Priv. Investment and High WUI (model 2 Gov Spending
USA). Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 15: Impulse Response Function - GDP, Priv. Investment and Low WUI (model 2 Gov Spending
USA). Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 16: Impulse Response Function - Priv. Consumption High and Low WUI (model 2 Gov Spending
USA). Source: Authors’ calculations.
The following figure highlights the fiscal multipliers for model 1 and for models asso-
ciated with the EPU and WUI indexes (model 2). Model 1 presents the multipliers in
two different ways. The first uses the complete set of data, as observed in the traditional
literature. The second presents the multipliers in two uncertainty scenarios: high and low
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EPU. Finally, the results for model 2 are presented, considering the EPU and WUI, both
for the high and low uncertainty scenarios.
As we can observe, the reflexes of uncertainty are transmitted to the multipliers. In an
environment of high uncertainty, agents are more cautious and postpone some decisions.
Therefore, a greater fiscal effort is needed to achieve the same results observed under
conditions of economic normality.
Table 5: Fiscal Multipliers: Government Consumption and Investment- USA
Source: Authors’ calculations.
For the traditional scenario (model 1), the impact and accumulated multipliers are statis-
tically different from zero until the third quarter (±2S.E) and after that quarter the lower
band is very close to the horizontal axis. Thus, the impulses are very similar to the find-
ings of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). They describe that the bands are wide and the
IRF of GDP becomes statistically insignificant after one year. Our estimates are also in
line with different studies that demonstrate that public investment multiplier (impact) is
greater than one.
Our findings suggest that the government spending shock has a positive effect on GDP,
with typically Keynesian responses. Moreover, regardless of the uncertainty index used,
the influence of high uncertainty on economic activity is negative, and a reduction in the
effectiveness of fiscal multipliers.
5.3 Model 1: Brazil (1996Q1 – 2018Q4)
In this model, some adjustments were necessary, due to the unavailability of data for
public and private investments. In this sense, government spending is associated with
government consumption. The variables are the log differences of real output (GDP),
Government Consumption (GC) and Household Consumption (HC).
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Our basic specification is:
Yt =C+
p
∑
i=1
AiYt−i + εt (19)
Here, C denotes a (3x1) vector of intercept terms, t represents the (3x1) vector of the three
endogenous variables. A is the matrix of autoregressive coefficients of order (3x3).
Yt = [∆ lnGCt ,∆ lnHCt ,∆ lnGDPt ] The vector of disturbances is εt =
[
εGCt ,ε
HC
t ,ε
GDP
t ].
The appropriate number of lags for the system is estimated with a model for stationary
series. Based on Akaike Information the optimal lag is 5. The model is stable, all inverse
roots of the characteristic polynomial lie within the unit circle, the assumptions associated
with the residues was verified, and there is no autocorrelation. We also conclude that p-
value does not allow rejecting, for any assumed level of significance, the null hypothesis
of homoskedasticity.
Table 6: Lag Order Selection Criteria (Model 1 Brazil).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 17 depicts the impulse response function of a government consumption shock.
As in the results for US models, public spending plays an important role in stimulating
household consumption and economic activity. The impulse response functions indicate
the positive effect of public spending (consumption). The cumulative effects remain for
more than 10 quarters for household consumption and GDP.
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Figure 17: Impulse Response Function (Model 1 Brazil). Source: Authors’ calculations.
The variance decomposition of GDP shows an increasing relevance of public spending
over the quarters. We can see a similar conclusion for the household consumption.
Figure 18: Variance Decomposition (Model 1 Brazil). Source: Authors’ calculations.
The present paper differs from some studies that point to null or negative multipliers
for developing economies. However, our estimates are in accordance with the results of
Carrière-Swallow et al. (2018) and Peres (2006). The latter also used a model based on
Blanchard and Perotti (2002). For data from 1994 to 2005, the author found Keynesian
responses to GDP after government spending shocks.
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5.4 Model 2: Brazil (1996Q1 - 2018Q4)
Similarly to the US models, we evaluate the effects of uncertainty on the Brazilian econ-
omy. Therefore, in this model our specification is:
Yt = A+BXt +
p
∑
i=1
(CYt−1 +DYt−1Xt−1)+ εt (20)
Where: A is a (3x1) vector of intercept terms; The vector of disturbances is εt =
[
εGCt ,ε
HC
t ε
GDP
t
]
.
Y hight = Â0 + B̂0
high
.X̂0 +
p
∑
i=1
(
B̂i
high
.Yt−i
)
+ Êt (21)
Y Lowt = Â0 + B̂0
Low
.X̂0 +
p
∑
i=1
(
B̂i
Low
.Yt−i
)
+ Êt (22)
The first conclusion that we can make is that public consumption has a statically-significant
expansionary impact when uncertainty is low. After examining the simulations, we ob-
serve that government consumption maintains their cumulative effect on GDP and house-
holds consumption. Conversely, when the uncertainty index is high the effects on eco-
nomic activity as well as on private consumption are negative (statically-insignificant).
Thus, the results suggest that the high uncertainty does not encourage household con-
sumption16.
Figure 19: Impulse Response Function (model 2 EPU Low -Brazil). Source: Authors’ calculations.
16Based on Akaike Information, the optimal lag is 1 (High EPU) and 3 (Low EPU).
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Figure 20: Impulse Response Function (model 2 EPU High - Brazil). Source: Authors’ calculations.
As in the United States model, we replaced the EPU index with the World Uncertainty
Index (WUI)17. The results indicate that fiscal innovations (Low WUI) have positive ef-
fects on economic activity. However, when public consumption is associated with the
WUI-High, it has more subtle effects on economic activity.
Figure 21: Impulse Response Function (model 2 WUI Low - Brazil). Source: Authors’ calculations.
17High WUI - three lags, and Low WUI - two lags. As in previous models, these models are stable, since
all inverse roots are within the unit circle. The assumptions associated with the residuals were verified
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Figure 22: Impulse Response Function (model 2 WUI High - Brazil). Source: Authors’ calculations.
The results with EPU and WUI present quite clear indications. When there is a high level
of uncertainty, the effect of government consumption on private consumption and GDP is
low or close to zero. Therefore, high uncertainty inhibits consumption and output. On the
other hand, when we observe a more predictable scenario, the effects of fiscal shocks are
positive and with statistically significant results.
Regarding the effects of uncertainty on consumer decisions and GDP, we find qualitative
similar results to those in the United States. In other words, an uncertain environment
creates a reducing effect on consumption, spreading out into the economy.
The figure below highlights the multipliers for the models investigated. The results pre-
sented point to evidence that moments of high uncertainty and the increased precaution
of agents are factors that can influence the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
Table 7: Fiscal Multipliers: Government Consumption - Brazil
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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6 Conclusion
In recent years, the effects of fiscal multipliers have aroused interest of policymakers and
researchers. Despite being a crucial issue, there is no consensus for advanced economies
and emerging countries. At the same time, the different uncertainty measures have re-
ceived considerable attention. This is motivated because high uncertainty may encourage
agents to postpone investment and consumption decisions. This paper contributes to this
debate by highlighting the channels and effects of uncertainty that, combined with fiscal
stimulus, interfere with economic growth.
Our findings indicate the presence of Keynesian effects. For traditional models, increases
in public expenditures have a positive effect on household consumption and economic
activity. We also find indications of the crowding-out effect of public expenditures on
private investment in the United States. For both countries, fiscal multipliers are positive
in the first quarter (impact) with 95% confidence. Contrary to what many studies indicate,
emerging countries with a high debt/GDP ratio may have positive fiscal multipliers.
As emphasised in the literature, our findings confirm that innovations in the uncertainty
indexes foreshadow declines in economic activity. In addition, there is evidence that fiscal
policy is less efficient in this context. We found evidence that uncertainty shocks dampen
private investment and household consumption, in line with the Real Options approach.
Thus, the increase in uncertainty hampers fiscal stimulus, as we observed in the results of
the impulse response functions.
For US data, the effects of uncertainty are clear when it reaches high levels. However, low
uncertainty does not seem to stimulate individuals, suggesting that decisions are reviewed
for more pessimistic scenarios. For Brazil, the results indicate that fiscal policy is more
effective when uncertainty is low. Thus, our results point to cautious individuals when the
high uncertainty overshadows the definition of an economic scenario.
Despite this evidence, our investigation has limitations. We believe that a study that con-
siders a larger sample of developing countries, can confirm the findings and bring new
information about the effects of uncertainty and fiscal policy in emerging countries.
The findings of this study can assist in the formulation or simulation of future fiscal strate-
gies, considering non-Ricardian agents. Specifically, for the Brazilian case, to support the
debate on the current rules of contingency to fiscal stimulus and the need to mitigate the
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
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able from: http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/Default.aspx. Accessed: 10/11/2019.
Issler, J. V., Lima, L. R. (2000). Public debt sustainability and endogenous seigniorage in
Brazil: time-series evidence from 1947–1992. Journal of development Economics, 62(1),
131-147.
Keynes, J. M. (1936). The general theory of employment, interest and money. London:
Macmillan. Knight, F. (1921). Risk, uncertainty and profit. London: Houghton Mifflin.
Khalid, A. M. (1996). Ricardian equivalence: empirical evidence from developing economies.
Journal of Development Economics, 51(2), 413-432.
Kilponen, J., Pisani, M., Schmidt, S., Corbo, V., Hledik, T., Hollmayr, J., Hurtado, S.,
Julio, P., Kulikov, D., Lemoine, M., Lozej, M., Lundvall, H., Maria, J., Micallef, B.,
Papageorgiou, D., Rysanek, J., Sideris, D., Thomas, C. Lozej, M. (2019). Comparing
39
fiscal consolidation multipliers across models in Europe. International Journal of Central
Banking, 15(3), 285-320.
KILPONEN, Juha et al. Comparing fiscal consolidation multipliers across models in
Europe. International Journal of Central Banking, v. 15, n. 3, p. 285-320, 2019.
Knight, F. H. (1921). 1921. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.
Ludvigson, S. C., Ma, S., Ng, S. (2015). Uncertainty and business cycles: exogenous im-
pulse or endogenous response? (No. w21803). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Lukasz Komsta (2011). outliers: Tests for outliers. R package version 0.14. Available
from: https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=outliers. Accessed: 10/11/2019.
Lütkepohl, H. (2005). New introduction to multiple time series analysis. Springer Science
Business Media.
Manteu, C., Serra, S. (2017). Medidas de incerteza e o seu impacto na economia por-
tuguesa.
Martin, V., Hurn, S., Harris, D. (2013). Econometric modelling with time series: specifi-
cation, estimation and testing. Cambridge University Press.
Matheson, T.; Pereira, J. Fiscal multipliers for Brazil. International Monetary Fund, IMF
Working papers, 2016.
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Figure A7: Model 2 (EPU-Low) USA
Figure A8: Model 2 (EPU-Low) USA - VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests
44
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Figure A14: Model 2 (WUI-Low) USA - VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests
46
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